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Abstract  
 
Almost in a blink of the eye the policy focus on the ‘knowledge’ economy, with mass ranks 
of high skilled workers, has given way to claims of widespread ‘technological 
unemployment’. This Working Paper will examine competing claims on the relationship 
between automation, skills and the future of work. It examines the research evidence on 
the scale of job losses anticipated as a consequence of digital disruption. It presents three 
scenarios of the impact of digital disruption on future skill requirements, before considering 
how evidence on automation and digital disruption is used to influence and inform UK 
government policy interventions on skills, employment and labour markets. In conclusion, 
we recommend caution in interpreting existing evidence. While high profile reports on 
digital disruption make for eye-catching headlines, they make for poor policy formulation. A 
key message is that technology is not destiny. It is human decisions that will determine the 
future of work. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The ‘digital economy’ is argued to be transforming all aspects of economy and society, 
raising fundamental questions about the future of work and the skills required to meet the 
changing ‘needs’ of industry (House of Lords 2015). A number of high profile reports on the 
UK, for example, have identified future employment demand in Science, Technology, 
Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) related fields as key to Britain’s economic future and 
to achieving higher rates of intergenerational social mobility (Sutton Trust 2017). The 
opportunities and challenges afforded by the digital economy have been widely reported in 
the UK media, although the benefits of the ‘new machine age’ (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 
2014) are often over-shadowed by concerns about the impact of automation, and in 
particular robots, on the world of work. Many commentators draw on the work of Frey and 
Osborne (2013), citing dramatic numbers of potential job losses:  
 
‘Robots are coming for your job: and faster than you think’ (Daily Telegraph 
21/1/16). 
‘More than 10 million UK workers are at high risk of being replaced by robots 
within 15 years as the automation of routine tasks gathers pace in a new 
machine age’ (The Guardian 24/3/17). 
‘‘40% of jobs’ taken by robots by 2030 but AI companies say they’re here to 
help’ (Metro 10/5/17). 
‘Society may COLLAPSE in 30 years as robots take half of all jobs, ex-Facebook 
exec warns’ (Express 7/8/2017). 
 
Such headlines have also been fuelled by reports from official bodies, such as the Bank of 
England and the House of Lords Select Committee: 
 
‘For the UK… up to 15 million jobs could be at risk of automation… Yet the 
smarter machines become, the greater the likelihood that the space 
remaining for uniquely-human skills could shrink further. Machines are 
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already undertaking tasks which were unthinkable – if not unimaginable – a 
decade ago. The driverless car was science fiction no more than a decade 
ago. Today, it is scientific fact.’ (Haldane 2015) 
 
‘We are facing a tsunami of technological change, driven by the digital 
revolution, affecting virtually all areas of our lives.’ (House of Lords 2015) 
 
Media reports primarily focus on impending ‘technological unemployment’ (Pecchi and Piga 
2008; Ford 2015), and on changing work patterns in the ‘gig’ or ‘platform’ economy (Kenney 
and Zysman (2016). Far less attention has been given to the policy and theoretical 
implications of ‘digital disruption’ for skill supply, demand and utilisation. This Working 
Paper goes some way in filling this gap by interrogating the implications of recent accounts 
of ‘digital disruption’, the ‘fourth industrial revolution’ or the ‘second machine age’ for the 
future of skill formation and for skills policy in the UK. For many decades, UK governments 
have based their skills policy on human capital ideas, with its primary focus on labour supply 
rather than demand.  
 
Orthodox human capital theory has been wedded to a version of Say’s Law, where supply 
creates its own demand, as employers seek to exploit the productive potential of an 
increasingly qualified workforce. More recently theories of skill-biased technological change 
(SBTC) have placed a greater emphasis on the role of new technologies driving the demand 
for skills, although they share much in common with earlier accounts developed by Schultz 
Becker and Mincer, in continuing to stress the importance of supply side-solutions based on 
the reform of education (Goldin and Katz 2008; Autor 2015). These theories, however, are 
being fundamentally challenged by rapid advances in digital technologies (Brown, Cheung 
and Lauder 2016, forthcoming). 
 
This Working Paper explores competing claims on the relationship between automation, 
skills and the future of work. In Section 2 we examine different interpretations of the 
research evidence on the scale of job losses anticipated as a consequence of digital 
disruption. Section 3 outlines three scenarios of the impact of digital disruption on future 
skill requirements.  Section 4 then considers how evidence on automation and digital 
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disruption is used to influence and inform UK government policy interventions on skills, 
employment and labour markets. The Conclusion recommends caution in interpreting 
available evidence, highlighting the need to avoid policy by ‘technological determinism’, and 
offers some suggestions for further research.  
2. Automation, Employment and the Digital Economy 
 
2.1 Automation and Technological Unemployment 
 
A burgeoning literature highlights the impact of ’technological disruption‘, originally defined 
by John Maynard Keynes (1930:20-21) as the discovery of new techniques of economising 
on labour, outrunning the pace at which we can find new uses for labour. Today, this is 
driven by advances across a number of interdisciplinary fields and mutually reinforcing 
technologies such as machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI), Internet of Things (IoT), 
robotics, additive manufacturing, synthetic biology, and smart materials (Brynjolfsson and 
McAfee 2014). While recognizing that digital innovation is likely to disrupt established 
models of education, employment and job market structures, the implications for labour 
supply and demand are widely contested. Studies can be broadly divided into those that 
present a strong negative relationship between automation and employment and those that 
provide an alternative view. 
2.1.1 Negative relationship between automation and employment 
 
Frey and Osborne (2017) is probably the most visible example of research presenting a bleak 
picture of how automation may affect the future of skills and jobs. They use an occupation-
based approach to analyse the relationship between automation and the future of work. 
They categorise ‘occupations according to their susceptibility to computerisation’ (meaning 
job automation by means of computer-controlled equipment) (Frey and Osborne 2017:254). 
They asked machine learning researchers to hand-label 70 occupations ‘assigning 1 if 
automatable and 0 if not’. They explain:  
 
‘For our subjective assessments, we draw upon a workshop held at the 
Oxford University Engineering Sciences Department, examining the 
automatability of a wide range of tasks. Our label assignments were based on 
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eyeballing the O*NET tasks and job description of each occupation. This 
information is particular to each occupation, as opposed to standardised 
across different jobs. The hand-labelling of the occupations was made by 
answering the question “Can the tasks of this job be sufficiently specified, 
conditional on the availability of big data, to be performed by state of the art 
computer-controlled equipment”. Thus, we only assigned a 1 to fully 
automatable occupations, where we considered all tasks to be automatable. 
To the best of our knowledge, we considered the possibility of task 
simplification, possibly allowing some currently non-automatable tasks to be 
automated. Labels were assigned only to the occupations about which we 
were most confident’ (Frey and Osborne 2017:263).  
 
They then used O*NET variables associated with the level of perception and manipulation, 
creativity and social intelligence required to perform the job (believed to limit the potential 
of computerisation) to supplement these subjective judgments and correct potential 
labelling errors. Based on the 70 occupations reviewed in this way, they constructed a 
model with which to estimate the possibility of automation of 702 occupations. Looking at 
the distribution of jobs in the US economy, they conclude that 47 percent of total 
employment is at risk. Frey and Osborne stress that they focus on technological capabilities, 
not actual job losses. Moreover, they are not specific regarding timeframes as they analyse 
what ‘occupations are potentially automatable over some specified number of years, 
perhaps a decade or two’ (Frey and Osborne 2017:265). 
 
Frey and Osborne’s occupational approach has been used in a range of other countries, with 
the assumption that the automation risk level for an occupation is the same across 
countries; as such, cross-country differences in the level of potential automation are seen to 
be driven by the occupational structure (Arntz et al. 2016). Pajarinen and Rouvinen (2014) 
estimate the share of jobs at risk in Finland at 35 percent, and Bowles (2014) between 40 
percent and 60 percent in Europe. Frey and Osborne, in collaboration with Deloitte (2014), 
estimate that 30 percent of jobs in London and 35 percent in the UK are at high risk of being 
made redundant by technology in the next 10 to 20 years – with a much higher proportion 
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for those jobs paying less than £30,000 per year. The Bank of England, based on a similar 
methodology, estimated that up to 15 million jobs could be at risk of automation (Haldane 
2015; Houses of Parliament 2016). 
 
Frey and Osborne, along with these associated studies, do not take into account new jobs 
that may be created as a result of automation. Therefore, these studies look at the potential 
for existing jobs to be automated, rather than examining the net impact of automation on 
jobs/ employment – for which an analysis of job creation is also required. Studies limited to 
the potential automatibility of jobs, have also been criticized for not taking economic 
aspects into account, such as the cost of replacing humans with machines, or as the 
Managing Director of VDMA Robotics, Schwarzkopf (2015) has put it: ‘tasks are only 
automated when this is economical. On the shop floor potential automatability has no 
validity, here things need to pay off’. 
 
McKinsey (2017) based on an analysis of 2,000 work activities across 800 occupations, 
estimates that half of the work activities taking place today could be automated by 2055, 
although this could ‘happen 20 years earlier or later’, depending on various factors (2017:8), 
including costs, labour market dynamics, economic benefits, along with social and 
regulatory acceptance. It also notes that ’less than 5 percent of all occupations can be 
automated entirely using demonstrated technologies, while 60 percent of all occupations 
have at least 30 percent of constituent activities that could be automated. More 
occupations will change than will be automated away’ (2017:8). 
 
The focus on job tasks in McKinsey’s (2017) study involved disaggregating occupations into 
activities and assessing the extent to which 18 performance capabilities (associated with 
sensory perception, cognitive, social, emotional and natural language processing 
capabilities) were required in those activities, along with the required level of competence 
in those capabilities to perform the work activity ’successfully‘. They then assessed the 
performance of existing technologies on the same criteria:  
 
’By estimating the amount of time spent on each of these work activities, we 
were able to estimate the automation potential of occupations in sectors 
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across the economy, comparing them with hourly wage levels. Drawing on 
industry experts, we also developed scenarios for how rapidly the 
performance of automation technologies could improve in each of these 
capabilities. The analysis we conducted for the United States provided us 
with a template for estimating the automation potential and creating 
adoption timing scenarios for 45 other economies representing about 80 
percent of the global workforce‘ (2017: 14). 
 
Grace et al. (2017) surveyed machine-learning researchers who had published during 2015 
in two leading conferences on AI. They sought their views on when they believed AI would 
outperform humans on a range of activities. The results, based on a sample of 352 
respondents (21% of the authors contacted), show that researchers predicted that AI will 
outperform humans in many of those activities (such as translating languages, writing 
school essays, driving a truck) in the next ten years, and will outperform humans in a 
number of others within a 40-year period (working in retail, writing a bestselling book, 
working as a surgeon). They further report that researchers ‘believe there is a 50% chance 
of AI outperforming humans in all tasks in 45 years and of automating all human jobs in 120 
years’ (Grace et al. 2017:1). 
 
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017:2) ‘move away beyond feasibility studies’, such as those by 
Osborne and Frey and Grace et al., to focus on the actual use of robotics. They draw on data 
from the International Federation of Robotics (IFR) on the use of industrial robots (in 19 
industries) between 1990 and 2007 in the US, together with data on employment shares 
from the US Census to show that the introduction of robots has ‘large and robust’ negative 
effects on employment. This study is based on a model ‘where robots and workers compete 
in the production of different tasks’ and takes into account that ‘the share of tasks 
performed by robots varies across industries and there is trade between labour markets 
specializing in different industries’. This is argued to be important as robots are assumed to 
affect employment and wages negatively through displacement (of workers from tasks 
previously performed), but also positively through productivity effects (‘as other industries 
and/or tasks increase their demand for labor’). Their model ‘shows that the impact of robots 
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on employment and wages in a labour market can be estimated by regressing the change in 
these variables on the exposure to robots, a measure defined as the sum over industries of 
the national penetration of robots into each industry times the baseline employment share 
of that industry in the labour market’ (pp.2-3).  
 
These specifications provide the starting point for their empirical strategy. They thus exploit 
differences in the penetration of robots by industry and the local distribution of 
employment across industries to estimate that ‘one more robot per thousand workers 
reduces the employment to population ratio by about 0.18-0.34 percentage points and 
wages by 0.25-0.5 percent’ (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2017:1). This is equivalent to ‘one new 
robot reducing employment by 5.6 workers’ (p.4), taking into account increases in 
employment in other areas of the economy through productivity effects. Without taking this 
into account, the figure the authors provide is a reduction of 6.2 workers per new robot. 
 
The OECD has started a new approach to add information on the relationship between 
computers and skills. Their ‘computers and skills demand project’ (OECD 2017) used the 
Programme for International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) data (assessing 
competence levels in literacy, numeracy and problem solving) to compare the performance 
of computers and human workers. They report than less than 15 percent of workers use 
those skills ‘on a daily basis with a proficiency that is clearly higher than computers’ (Elliott, 
2017). This study focuses on only three of the skills that are used at work. The OECD notes 
that the approach could be extended to other skills to develop a more accurate view on 
computers’ capabilities to substitute for human labour. 
2.1.2 An alternative view 
 
Arntz et al. (2016:4) argue that much of the research evidence presenting a strong negative 
relationship between automation and work is methodologically flawed. In particular, they 
take issue with occupation-based approaches, such as that used by Frey and Osborne, on 
the grounds that they overestimate job automatibility: ‘Occupations labelled as high-risk 
occupations often still contain a substantial share of tasks that are hard to automate’. 
Automation targets tasks rather than occupations, and many occupations have tasks that 
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are difficult to automate (Autor 2014:39). As a result, adjustments to technology often take 
the form of changes in tasks within occupation rather than changes in employment shares 
between occupations (Arntz et al. 2016). 
 
They also use PIACC data, that gathers information about task structures across OECD 
countries, and estimate the relationship between workplace tasks and the automatibility 
defined by Frey and Osborne (Arntz et al. 2016:12). Using PIAAC individual level data on 
actual tasks performed, they take into account the way that tasks vary by job within the 
same occupation. This approach enables a better exploration of differences between 
countries, as it does not depend on the assumption that task structures will be constant 
across them. 
 
Arntz et al. estimate that, on average for the 21 OECD countries that they include in their 
analysis, 9 percent of jobs are automatable –the range goes from 6 percent in Korea to 12 
percent in Austria. This is much lower than in Osborne and Frey’s study: ‘not taking account 
of the variation of tasks within occupations exerts a huge impact on the estimated 
automatability of jobs’ (Arntz et al. 2016:14). They underline that their own figures are likely 
to be an overestimation given (1) economic, legal, social and ethical barriers preventing or 
slowing down automation, (2) possibilities of job-task reorganization and workers switching 
tasks to focus on those that are not automated and (3) the creation of additional jobs 
‘through demand for new technologies and through higher competitiveness’ (Ibid. p.4). 
 
Their main conclusion is that ‘automation and digitalization are unlikely to destroy large 
numbers of jobs. However, low qualified workers are likely to bear the brunt of the 
adjustment costs as the automatability of their jobs is higher compared to highly qualified 
jobs’ (Ibid.:4). Based on this premise, the implications of the study are that there is a ‘need 
to focus more on the potential inequalities and requirements for (re-)training arising from 
technological change than the general threat of unemployment that technological progress 
might or might not cause‘ (Ibid:25). They find that high educational requirements and jobs 
requiring cooperation or where workers spend larger proportions of time influencing others 
are less subject to automatability. Routine tasks (related to the exchange of information, 
selling, or using fingers and hands), and jobs that have high shares of those tasks, are more 
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exposed to automation. It should be noted that Arntz et al.’s task-based approach still relies 
on experts’ assessment rather than actual use of technologies in the workplace. 
 
Autor (2014) also argues that the extent to which machines will be able to replace humans 
at work is often overestimated because the challenges in automating tasks requiring 
flexibility, judgment and common sense, ‘remain immense’ (Autor 2014:1). A central point 
in his argument is that machines’ complementarities with certain types of human labour can 
increase productivity, earnings and demand for skilled workers. He notes the ‘deceleration 
of employment growth in abstract-intensive occupations after 2000’ and provides evidence 
suggesting that the ‘locus of displacement of middle-skills employment is moving into 
higher skilled territories’ (2014:23-24). Autor examines whether this may be due to 
technology having climbed up in the task domain so that it can now substitute for 
professional, technical and managerial occupations. While he notes that this possibility 
should not be dismissed, he uses data on computer and software investment to cast doubt 
over this interpretation: if technology could now substitute for highly paid work, he argues, 
we should be seeing a marked corporate increase in investment in technology whereas the 
opposite has happened. Autor interprets the reduction in investment after 2000 as the 
‘bursting of a bubble’ (Ibid. p.29) after the 1990s craze in investment, which restricted 
innovation and demand for high skilled workers. He concludes that even in this era of 
uncertainty, we can be fairly confident that ‘the technological advances that have secularly 
pushed outward the demand for skilled labor over many decades will continue to do so’ 
(Ibid. p.39). The implication is that ‘human capital must be at the heart of any long-term 
strategy for producing skills that are complemented rather than substituted by technology’ 
(p.39). 
 
Graetz and Michaels (2015) use the increase in industrial robots between 1993 and 2007 (in 
17 countries across the developed world) to analyse their impact on employment. Using 
data from the Industrial Federation of Robotics (IFR) to estimate ‘robot density’ across 14 
industries, they examine differences in real value added, labour productivity and hours 
worked.1 They find little reason for concern during that period, noting no significant effect 
on total hours worked, although they also observed ‘some evidence that robots reduced the 
hours of both low-skilled and middle-skilled workers’ (Graetz and Michaels 2015:1). They do 
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not find effects on the hours worked by high-skilled workers, those with a college degree 
and above, which they take to confirm skill-biased technological change (SBTC) arguments. 
They estimate that such increases in the use of robots were responsible for 10 percent of 
the GDP growth and 15 percent of the productivity gains in those economies, and 
documented congestion effects as ‘larger increases in robot density translated into 
increasingly small gains in productivity’ (diminishing marginal gains). The question is 
whether similar trends will stand today and in the near future. As the authors note ‘there is 
plenty of potential for increased use of robots in new industries’ and to use their increased 
capabilities to a greater extent in the industries where they are already in use – even though 
the congestion effects that they report suggest that ‘robot densification is not a panacea for 
growth’ (Ibid.:5). 
 
2.1.3 Evaluating the Evidence 
 
The different approaches identified above indicate that the impact of automation and 
digital technologies on employment are widely contested. The literature presents varied 
expectations regarding the potential of automation to replace workers, in part, because 
some studies look at what robots/ computers are able to do now, whereas others reflect on 
what computers will be able to do in the future (near or far). What computers will be able to 
do is a moving target, and expectations around it need to be continuously revised and 
reformulated. 
 
The literature making prospective estimations (whether occupation or task-focused), relies 
overwhelmingly on expert judgment in making evaluations on the changing relationship 
between automation and the future of work. However, technical experts tend to 
overestimate the capacity of new technologies (Arntz et al. 2016; Autor 2014). There are 
also some ‘retrospective’ studies providing estimates based on the effects of the 
introduction of robots on employment, but the data used is somewhat dated, and there are 
significant methodological problems in assuming that investment in technology determines 
changes in employment statistics. 
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Blanket claims about the impact of digital technologies overlook the way that they are 
applied across sectors and occupations. Typically, it is low skilled jobs that are assumed to 
be most in danger, consistent with long established ideas about technological progress and 
the occupational structure. However, there is growing evidence of new technologies 
transforming professional, managerial and technical occupations. Moreover, the studies 
reviewed rarely take into account the potential for job creation around automation, or for 
the relocation of those made redundant as a result of automation. As a result, the picture of 
the net impact of automation on the labour market is partial.  
 
Most studies focus on the potential for automation, without incorporating into their models 
economic and social factors that may stimulate or deter the replacement of workers by 
technology. As such, much of the literature falls back on technological determinism, with 
little reference to the way companies ‘choose’ to deploy new technologies or to the 
capitalist economy, which is the engine for technological innovation (Schumpeter 1943). 
Martin Ford, for example, suggests that the evidence already shows that, ‘a race between 
technology and our ability to reform our political and economic systems is really no race at 
all… as… machines are likely to permanently take over a great deal of the work now 
performed by human beings.’ (Ford 2009:4-5). But it is human decisions that are taken by 
people in power within organisations or governments that shape the introduction and use 
of these technologies. As Simon Head observes, although we are often talking about 
abstract electronic and statistical entities which are impersonal, ‘all the system’s rules and 
commands in fact have human origins in the superior expertise of the technical, managerial 
elite whose wisdom is baked into the system’ (Head 2014:185).  
 
Most of the research also provides little detail on the time-frames for replacing humans by 
technology. Almost without exception the literature on digital disruption is replete with 
vague references to how long it will take for the workplace, jobs and skills to be 
transformed in the way that industrialism transformed agricultural employment. The failure 
to specify when tomorrow’s world become today’s world, is particularly important to all 
stakeholders as there is a vast difference between half of existing occupations disappearing 
or being significantly reformed in the next 10 years as opposed to 25-30 years’ time.  
 
12 
 
The next section goes beyond the focus on job numbers to look at the skills implications of 
the ‘digital’ economy. As we will show, research in this area has been much more limited. 
 
3. Automation, Skills and the Digital Economy: Three Accounts 
 
When we examine the skills implications of what can loosely be described as ‘digital 
disruption’, there are three main positions, although the boundaries between them are 
somewhat fuzzy and some of these accounts converge on specific points. Much of this 
literature is not directly comparable as writers focus on different aspects of digital 
disruption. Some, for example, concentrate on the potential decline in employment 
numbers resulting from automation and advances in machine learning, while others look at 
new ways of working in the ‘gig’ or ‘platform’ economy. The three views can be 
characterised as ‘labour scarcity’, ‘job scarcity’ and ‘end of work’.2  
 
1. Labour Scarcity – Despite an emphasis on changing skill requirements, occupational 
restructuring and labour market disruption, the labour scarcity (Autor 2015) 
approach retains a largely optimistic account of new areas of jobs growth and skills 
upgrading, consistent with established theories of human capital and skill-biased 
technological change. It claims that there will be an increasing demand for high 
skilled workers and a reduction in demand for lower skilled workers as more routine 
jobs are automated and people retrain for more skilled jobs.  
 
2.  Job Scarcity – This approach recognises that new technologies may enhance the 
skills of a relatively small proportion of the workforce, but the general direction of 
technological innovation is towards the redesign of existing jobs, where much of the 
knowledge content is captured in software that permit a great level of 
standardisation and potential to deskill or automate a wide range of occupations, 
including technical, professional and managerial roles. Here, job scarcity points to a 
significant skills mismatch between an expanding supply of educated and skilled 
workers, and scarcity of good quality job opportunities, primarily resulting from the 
13 
 
routinisation and segmentation of job roles rather than ‘technological 
unemployment’.  
 
3. End of Work – This approach views technological unemployment (Keynes 1930) as 
transforming the future of work, along with the labour market foundations of 
capitalism. In the post-capitalist era, it is claimed that we need to rethink the 
purpose of education, skill formation and the labour market.   
 
3.1 Labour Scarcity 
 
The labour scarcity approach conforms to the longstanding view that the economy and 
demand for skills are defined by the stage of technological development. The more 
technologically advanced an economy the greater the demand for skilled people ‘doing 
clever things for a living’. As in the past, new positions and professions are believed to 
emerge to replace any job losses due to technological disruption. This view is informed by 
theories of human capital and skill-biased technological change (SBTC). According to its 
mainstream version, new technologies alter the relative demand for different types of 
labour, leading to an increased demand for skilled workers. The education system therefore 
remains at the heart of economic and social policy, as the relationship between technology 
and education is not only the source of economic growth but also wage (in)equality. David 
Autor (2015) writes ‘the primary system of income distribution in market economies is 
rooted in labor scarcity; citizens possess (or acquire) a bundle of valuable “human capital” 
that, due to its scarcity, generates a flow of income over the career path’.3 This is to 
envisage a future of work characterised by a shortage (or scarcity) of people with higher-
level marketable skills.   
 
Goldin and Katz (2008) argue that there is a race between education and technology, the 
outcome of which explains patterns of wage inequalities in America. The race is ‘between 
the growth in the demand for skills driven by technological advances and the growth in the 
supply of skills driven by demographic change, educational investment choices, and 
immigration’ (2008:91). They conclude that educational wage differentials and wage 
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inequalities since 1980 result from problems in the supply of skills that has failed to respond 
to an acceleration in demand due to shifts in technological change. Such accounts have 
helped to fuel the expansion of higher education around the world and contributed to a 
greater focus on STEM-related fields. Other interpretations point to the need for 
educational reforms to develop the skills that are seen as crucial for an advanced digital 
economy (Hanushek and Woessmann 2015; House of Lords 2015). 
 
Integral to this argument is the view that ‘digital disruption’ may lead to technological 
unemployment but this is likely to be short term, as economic history suggests that new 
jobs will emerge even if we cannot specify them in advance. Such uncertainty, if anything, 
adds to the importance of education and skill formation in preparing people to be adaptable 
rather than simply skilled. Those currently in low skilled, routine jobs, who are judged to be 
most at risk of automation, will therefore need to upgrade their skills to take advantage of 
emerging, if unspecified, areas of higher skilled job growth.  
 
Klaus Schwab, founder of the World Economic Forum, suggests that we have entered a 
‘fourth industrial revolution’ although its full implications are yet to be grasped. He points to 
the ‘unlimited possibilities’ of billions of people connected by mobile devices offering access 
to real time data and leading-edge knowledge; unprecedented processing power and data 
storage; and: 
 
‘a confluence of emerging technology breakthroughs, covering wide-ranging 
fields such as artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, the internet of things (IoT), 
autonomous vehicles, 3D printing, nanotechnology, biotechnology, material 
sciences, energy storage and quantum computing, to name a few. Many of 
these innovations are in their infancy, but they are already reaching an 
inflection point in their development as they build on and amplify each other 
in a fusion of technologies across the physical, digital and biological worlds.’ 
(Schwab 2016:1). 
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These technologies, he argues, will result in many new positions and professions being 
created. While these are currently difficult to foresee, he claims, ‘I am convinced that talent, 
more than capital, will represent the critical production factor. For this reason, scarcity of a 
skilled workforce rather the availability of capital is more likely to be the crippling limit to 
innovation, competitiveness and growth’ (Schwab 2016:44-45; Autor 2015). Although 
perpetuating the view that developing skills and individual talents is key to the future, he 
suggests that what we mean by ‘high skill’ is likely to change as it can no longer be limited to 
holding a degree or having a specific set of professional capabilities: ‘the fourth industrial 
revolution will demand and place more emphasis on the ability of workers to adapt 
continuously and learn new skills and approaches within a variety of contexts.’ (Schwab 
2016:45).  
 
Therefore, inequality in the era of digital disruption will be linked to ‘ontological inequality’, 
separating those willing to adapt and those who resist change, as he predicts, ‘we may 
witness an increasing degree of polarization in the world, marked by those who embrace 
change versus those who resist it’ (Schwab 2016:97). Such a view is consistent with 
orthodox human capital theory, where individual incomes are primarily a result of whether 
people are willing to invest in their education.  
 
The literature we categorise under labour scarcity, includes writers and researchers with 
divergent views on the impact of automation on existing and future levels of employment, 
but similar views on the ‘supply’ side solutions. David Autor, referred to above, suggests 
that claims of widespread technological unemployment are exaggerated, pointing to 
periodic warnings over the last two centuries, including the Luddite movement of the early 
nineteenth century: ‘I expect that a significant stratum of middle-skill jobs combining 
specific vocational skills with foundational middle-skills levels of literacy, numeracy, 
adaptability, problem solving, and common sense will persist in coming decades’ (Autor 
2015:27).  
 
Autor’s view stands in stark contrast to Carl Frey and Michael Osborne’s (2013) claim that 
47 per cent of America jobs could be at risk of computerization. They suggest jobs in 
transportation and logistics, office administration and production occupations are 
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particularly at risk. But what makes these arguments consistent, is the idea that those with 
lower skills are at most risk and therefore there is a race between technology and education 
to develop more advanced skills to remain relevant in tomorrow’s labour market: 
  
‘Our model predicts a truncation in the current trend towards labour market 
polarisation, with computerisation being principally confined to low-skill and 
low-wage occupations. Our findings thus imply that as technology races 
ahead, low-skill workers will reallocate to tasks that are non-susceptible to 
computerisation – i.e., tasks requiring creative and social intelligence.’ (Frey 
and Osborne 2013:45) 
 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014:11) also make a direct link to the second machine age, in 
which ‘technological progress is going to leave behind some people, perhaps even a lot of 
people, as it races ahead’ but at the same time, they argue: 
 
‘there’s never been a better time to be a worker with special skills or the right 
education, because these people can use technology to create and capture value. 
However, there’s never been a worse time to be a worker with only “ordinary” skills 
and abilities to offer, because computers, robots, and other digital technologies are 
acquiring these skills and abilities at an extraordinary rate.’ 
 
Here the fundamental challenge remains the reform of education systems to prepare the 
future workforce to take advantage of new opportunities emerging within a technologically 
advanced economy. This may include offering opportunities to less privileged students (i.e. 
poor families, women and ethnic minorities), by dismantling barriers to occupational 
mobility widely recognised to confront their access to the established professions (Brown 
2013; McKnight 2015). 
 
The labour scarcity approach can also be seen in much of the literature that focuses on the 
‘gig’ or ‘sharing’ economy. The restructuring of work leads people to work in multiple 
contexts, breaking established models of employment and career development. Many 
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accounts of these changes highlight the need to ‘reskill’ the workforce as more people are 
given an opportunity to use their skills, knowledge and talent to earn a living, even if this no 
longer conforms to the conventional model of organisational success (Huws, Spender and 
Joyce 2016). 
 
There has been a lot of discussion about online digital platforms with the potential to 
disrupt many areas of employment in a diverse range of business activities, including travel, 
accommodation, retail, banking, education and training, and software development (Srnicek 
2017). Platforms such as Uber, Airbnb, Upwork, Profinder and Freelancer, are not only seen 
to offer a quick and cost-effective way of linking supply and demand but according to 
Schwab (2016:20) ‘enables the effective use of under-utilized assets – namely those 
belonging to people who had previously never thought of themselves as suppliers (i.e. of a 
seat in their car, a spare bedroom in their home, a commercial link between a retailer and 
manufacturer, or the time and skill to provide a service like delivery, home repair or 
administrative tasks)’.4 
 
The idea of the gig economy is often presented as new, exciting and entertaining. It 
describes how digital technologies are being used to break with out-dated ways of working 
based on the amount of time you spend in the office or factory. The gig economy presents a 
different world of work in which people are given greater freedom, no longer contracted to 
sacrifice five or six days a week in exchange for a pay check. Individuals are free to decide 
when, where, and for how long they want to work. It is typically represented by freelance 
consultants with expert knowledge and skills to sell through digital platforms such as 
freelancer.com, upwork.com, etc. It is also characterised as an inevitable shift in response to 
the changing aspirations of a younger generation of ‘digital natives’ who it is claimed no 
longer want to work 9-5, day-in-day-out for other people.   
 
Such interpretations of the need for re-skilling has also been linked to ‘bottom up’ 
innovation and social (as well as economic) enterprise, driven by declining marginal costs of 
communication and production, meaning that you do not need to own factories, offices or 
expensive computers to participate in new forms of economic activities. In short, the same 
technological trends that are enabling companies to develop sophisticated global value 
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chains through process innovation also make available micro-level co-production. With the 
growth of digital platforms, such as itunes apps, etc. it is believed that it is possible for 
anyone to develop new applications for sale or make them free to others. There has been a 
lot of interest in the Internet of Things, 3D printing, open manufacturing, and MOOCs, 
within a ‘sharing’ economy enabling people to contribute to, and benefit from, the 
‘collaborative commons’ (Anderson 2012).5  
3.2 Job Scarcity   
 
While some highlight reskilling, consistent with skill-biased technological change, others 
point to the prospects of digital disruption, resulting in increasing standardization, 
routinisation, and the de-skilling of a significant proportion of the workforce. This 
alternative interpretation raises fundamental questions about the future demand for 
‘knowledge’ workers, job quality and human capital assumptions about earnings matching 
learning. Here the focus has been less on the impact of automation on overall 
(un)employment, and more on the future demand for high skilled workers. While the 
‘knowledge’ economy is associated with scientific knowledge, technological innovative, and 
the creative industries, it is claimed that what is not adequately recognized is how digital 
innovation has also given company managers and executives new powers of control and 
command (Brown et al. 2011; Head 2014). 
Job scarcity accounts reject the human capital view that higher-level skills are the route to 
income growth through raising productivity (Piketty 2014; Stiglitz 2012). Rather, there is a 
recognition that it is not only about ‘technologies' but ‘capitalism’ (Schumpter 1943; 
Wajcman 2015). Technology is not destiny as its use is shaped by the forces and relations of 
production, that lead firms to deploy technologies in ways that sustain the proprietary rights 
of owners, shareholders, and senior executives. A view consistent with Schumpeter and 
insights from Marx, where capitalism is in a state of ‘constant commotion’ drawing on new 
technologies and business practices (Mason, 2015). 
Harry Braverman’s classic study of Labor Under Monopoly Capitalism argued that firms used 
technologies to enhance the power and control of business owners through a process of 
deskilling. He expressed skepticism about terms like ‘skill’, ‘training’ and ‘education’, which 
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he regarded as vague, making it difficult to assess claims of increasing skills ‘upgrading’ over 
time. He suggested that much of the work on skills upgrading is based on ‘impressionistic 
theory’ (Braverman 1974:424) and challenged the idea of an increase in the average 
demand for skill:  
‘Since, with the development of technology and the application to it of the 
fundamental sciences, the labor processes of society have come to embody a 
greater amount of scientific knowledge, clearly the “average” scientific, 
technical, and in that sense “skill” content of these labor processes is much 
greater now than in the past. But this is nothing but a tautology. The question 
is precisely whether the scientific and “educated” content of labor tends 
towards averaging, or on the contrary, towards polarization. If the latter is 
the case, to then say that the “average” skill has been raised is to adopt the 
logic of the statistician who, with one foot in the fire and the other in ice 
water, will tell you that “on the average”, he is perfectly comfortable. The 
mass of workers gain nothing from the fact that the decline in their command 
over the labor process is more than compensated for by the increasing 
command on the part of managers and engineers’ (Braverman 1974:425). 
This presents a different interpretation of the relationship between technological 
innovation and skills, in contrast to SBTC described above, as Braverman (1974:425) went 
on to note that ‘The more science is incorporated into the labor process, the less the worker 
understands of the process’. Therefore, while Braverman may be accused of 
underestimating the development of professional, managerial and technical employment in 
the latter decades of the twentieth century, the idea of knowledge being embedded in the 
labour process itself, rather than increasing opportunities for employees to use knowledge 
and skills, is of major significance to understanding today’s digital disruption. More recent 
evidence suggests that new technologies are enabling new forms of command and control 
by using digital software to capture knowledge and automate business processes. 
Brown, Lauder and Ashton (2011) argue that the twentieth century witnessed the 
widespread use of mechanical Taylorism characterised by the Fordist production line, where 
the knowledge of craft workers was captured by management, codified and re-engineered 
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in the shape of the moving assembly line, resulting in a clear divide between a semi-skilled 
workforce and the managers and professionals who controlled all aspect of factory life. 
Today, the same processes of knowledge capture are being applied to intermediate and 
high skilled employees in the service sector. Brown, et al. argue that the twenty-first century 
is an age of digital Taylorism. This involves translating knowledge work into working 
knowledge through the extraction, codification and digitalisation of knowledge into 
software prescripts and templates that can be transmitted and manipulated by others 
regardless of location. The result is the standardisation of functions and jobs, including an 
increasing proportion of technical, managerial and professional roles that raise fundamental 
questions about the future of ‘knowledge’ work:  
‘Companies may continue to pay a premium for outstanding talent, however 
it is defined, but they are increasingly segmenting their knowledge workers in 
an attempt to know more for less. Although some are given permission to 
think, increasing efforts are being made to translate knowledge work into 
working knowledge where what is in the minds of employees is captured and 
codified in the form of digital software, including online manuals and 
computer programs that can be controlled by companies and used by other 
often less skilled workers.’ (Brown, Lauder and Ashton 2011:66).  
 
Whereas the distinction between conception and execution in a period of mechanical 
Taylorism transformed the relationship between the working and middle classes, digital 
Taylorism takes the form of a power struggle within the middle classes, as these processes 
depend on reducing the autonomy and discretion of managers and professionals. As 
Wilensky (1960:557) predicted, ‘the men who once applied Taylor to the proletariat would 
themselves be Taylorized.’ The re-stratification or segmentation of ‘knowledge’ work, 
Brown et al. argue, restricts permission to think to those in ‘developer roles’, typically 
including staff in executive functions, along with those identified as high potential 
researchers, managers, and professionals. They are highly qualified and, in corporate 
settings, are expected to work on international engagements and are typically recruited 
from global elite universities.  
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Those in developer roles are distinct from ‘demonstrator roles’ where people are employed 
to implement or execute existing knowledge, procedures or managerial protocols. They 
include knowledge used by consultants, managers, teachers, nurses, and technicians, but 
delivered through digital software. Although demonstrator roles include well-qualified 
people, there is less scope to think outside the digital box as much of the expert knowledge 
is captured in expert (digital) systems. However, this does not always eliminate the need for 
good customer-facing skills as the standardisation required to achieve mass customisation 
still needs customers to feel that they are receiving a personalized service. This may 
contribute to a continuing demand for university graduates but these are far removed from 
the archetypal graduate jobs of the past.  
 
In turn, demonstrator roles are also distinct from ‘drone roles’ that offer little discretion to 
employees, although a good level of literacy, numeracy, and teamwork skills are often 
required. Much of the work is digitally controlled and includes back-office functions such as 
data entry jobs or customer contact roles in call centres, where virtually everything is 
prescribed or scripted in software packages. Many of these jobs are highly mobile as they 
can be standardized and digitalized. They are often filled by well-qualified workers either 
attracted by relatively high salaries in emerging economies or struggling to find a job that 
matches their training or expectations in developed economies. These are also roles that 
are most likely to be superseded by digital automation given advances in artificial 
intelligence, voice recognition and biorobotics (Brown, Lauder and Sung 2015). 
 
Simon Head’s (2014) account is consistent with Brown et al.’s as he sees the coming 
together of new technologies to perform highly complex tasks in the control and monitoring 
of business processes and employees as a high-tech version of Fredrick Winslow Taylor’s 
‘scientific management’. In what he calls ‘the first machine age’ he suggests: 
 
 ‘the working class occupied a world apart, tethered to factories and 
assembly lines and bearing the full rigors of industrialism. In the new machine 
age, the working class can be all of us. The new industrialism has pushed out 
from its old heartland in manufacturing to encompass much of the service 
economy, and it has also pushed upward in the occupational hierarchy to 
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include much of the professional and administrative middle class: physicians 
as well as call-center agents; teachers, academics, and publishers as well as 
“associates” at Walmart and Amazon; bank loan officers and middle 
managers as well as fast food workers.’ (Head 2014:5) 
 
Therefore, the application of new technologies to manufacturing is nothing new but the 
application of digital Taylorism to ‘white collar’ rather than ‘blue collar’ work has real 
revolutionary potential. Rather than sparking a new wave of ‘office’ employment, it has 
seen office work being standardized, digitalized and modularized. Susskind and Susskind 
(2015), view this differently as the liberation of the professions, breaking the monopoly of 
professional practices as expert knowledge becomes more widely accessible through new 
modes of digital communication, ‘as our systems and machines are becoming increasingly 
capable.’ As they note, ‘when it comes to the future capabilities of our machines, the overall 
trajectory of technological advance is clear and of great importance for the professions – 
more and more tasks that once required human beings are being performed more 
productively, cheaply, easily, quickly, and to a higher standard by a range of systems. And 
there is no apparent finishing-line’ (Susskind and Susskind 2015:159).  
 
Some writers have also pointed to the ways in which digital technologies have been used to 
develop standard platforms resulting in ‘on demand’ forms of non-standard flexible labour, 
in insecure or precarious jobs, with little access to basic employment rights, let alone skills 
training or career progression (Beck 2000; Standing 2011). Such models are associated with 
significant knowledge capture as customer information, billing, marketing and business 
development are controlled by those who operate the digital platforms.  
3.3 End of Work  
 
The ‘end of work’ approach pushes the discussion beyond changes in the nature of skills and 
work to include the future of capitalism. Jeremy Rifkin argues that the transformation of the 
workplace is part of a more profound shift in capitalism’s ability to raise productivity to the 
point that it approximates what economists call the ‘optimum general welfare’ where the 
cost of producing additional products and services has ‘zero’ marginal cost (Rifkin 2014:2-3).  
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To put this differently, it means that the profits typically made by those involved in 
delivering a college course, publishing a book or making products, are eliminated because of 
the declining cost of communicating, manufacturing and selling. He suggests that over a 
third of the world’s population are already producing their own information on relatively 
cheap smart phones and computers which they can share via video, audio and text at near 
zero marginal cost. Likewise, Paul Mason concludes that ‘the real danger inherent in 
robotization is something bigger than mass unemployment, it is the exhaustion of 
capitalism’s 250-year-old tendency to create new markets where old ones are worn out’ 
(Mason 2015:175). 
 
The point these authors and others are making is that the means of production are 
becoming cheaper because ‘information’ is positive sum, it is not used up in the same way 
as physical products. New technologies have reduced the cost of communicating and 
advanced computing so that anyone with access to the internet are plugged into a world of 
information. As the scope increases at the same time as costs decline, there is the potential 
for more social activities blurring the distinction between market and non-market activities. 
Facebook, for example, allows you to connect with family and friends but at the same time 
displays tailored adverts, depending on your recent web search history.  
 
According to Rifkin it is no longer credible to argue that productivity creates more jobs than 
it replaces, as ‘much of the productive economic activity of society is going to be 
increasingly placed in the “hands” of intelligent technology, supervised by small groups of 
highly skilled professional and technical workers’ (Rifkin 2014:129). Therefore, it is claimed 
that advances in machine intelligence, robotics and advanced analytics, holds the prospect 
of ‘liberating’ hundreds of millions of people from work in the market economy in the next 
20 to 30 years (Ibid. 121). 
 
Paul Mason similarly suggests that such trends mark the beginning of a post-capitalist era: 
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‘the rapid change in technology is altering the nature of work, blurring the 
distinction between work and leisure and requiring us to participate in the 
creation of value across our whole lives, not just in the workplace. This gives 
us multiple economic personalities, which is the economic base on which a 
new kind of person, with multiple selves, has emerged. It is this new kind of 
person, the networked individual, who is the bearer of the postcapitalist 
society that could now emerge. The technological direction of this revolution 
is at odds with its social direction. Technologically, we are headed for zero-
price goods, unmeasurable work, an exponential takeoff in productivity and 
the extensive automation of physical processes. Socially, we are trapped in a 
world of monopolies, inefficiency, the ruins of a finance-dominated free 
market and a proliferation of “bullshit jobs”. Today, the main contradiction in 
modern capitalism is between the possibility of free, abundant socially 
produced goods, and a system of monopolies, banks and governments 
struggling to maintain control over power and information. That is everything 
is pervaded by a fight between network and hierarchy.’ (Mason 2015:143-
144) 
 
Such a radical transformation of the occupational structure would render redundant the 
market distinction between labor supply and demand, between employers and employees, 
and between sellers and consumers. This would lead to a rapid growth in what Rifkin calls 
‘prosumers’, who will ‘be able to produce, consume, and share their own goods and services 
with one another on the Collaborative Commons at diminishing marginal costs approaching 
zero, bringing to the fore new ways of organizing economic life beyond the traditional 
capitalist market model’ (Rifkin 2014:132; Frayne 2015). 
 
In pursuing the same line of argument, Jeremy Rifkin raises the ultimate question of what is 
the human race going to do with itself if mass employment disappears from economic life: 
 
‘What if the marginal cost of human labor in the production and distribution 
of goods and services were to plummet to near zero as intelligent technology 
25 
 
substitutes for workers across every industry and professional and technical 
field, allowing businesses to conduct much of the commercial activity of 
civilization more intelligently, efficiently, and cheaply than with conventional 
workforces? That too is occurring as tens of millions of workers have already 
been replaced by intelligent technologies in industries and professional 
bodies around the world. What would the human race do, and more 
importantly, how would it define its future on Earth, if mass and professional 
labor were to disappear from economic life over the course of the next two 
generations? That question is now being seriously raised for the first time in 
intellectual circles and public policy debates.’ (Rifkin 2014:70)   
 
This approach is different from the others in highlighting the end of work rather than the 
transformation of work, at least in the terms we have come to think about work as waged 
employment. The idea of digital disruption typically plays a central role in such accounts as 
it implies that the fundamental economic problem of material abundance, rather than 
material scarcity, has been solved by a revolution in productivity, facilitated by technological 
innovation no longer dependent on mass employment (Gorz 1999). This transforms the 
nature and purpose of education and skill formation, from an emphasis on employability 
skills to a more holistic view of life skills beyond standard models of employment and career 
development. 
 
This section has distinguished three approaches with regards to skills, work and the digital 
economy: labour scarcity, job scarcity and the end of work. These approaches have different 
policy implications which mirror the current lack of consensus revealed in current research 
on automation and the future of work. Given this lack of consensus, the following section 
will examine the policy responses to ‘digital disruption’ in the UK.  
  
4. Policy responses  
 
How is the Westminster government responding to the potential impact of digital 
automation on employment and skills? In this section, we first explore UK Parliamentary 
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committees and government documents, identifying the evidence they draw upon and how 
they view the potential disruption to employment and skills. To date, there has been little in 
the way of analysis of the likely implications for employment, although there has been some 
shift in skills policy. The paper then outlines attempts by the robotics and AI academic 
community, and the social partners to influence government policy in this area. 
 
4.1 Engaging with technological change 
 
Rather than emanating from government, the first important reference to the employment 
and skills consequences of robotics and AI is a House of Lords ad hoc committee on digital 
skills established in 2014 to ‘consider information and communications technology, 
competitiveness and skills in the United Kingdom’ (House of Lords 2015:17). The subsequent 
report argues that major transformation is already taking place in digitalisation, citing the 35 
per cent potential jobs losses derived from the Frey and Osborne methodology discussed 
above (Frey et al. 2014). In addition, the future poses a ‘tsunami’ of change: 
 
‘Over the coming years the UK will witness a transformation of 
unprecedented magnitude as workers will have to move to new occupations 
and industries. It is unknown whether there will be net job loss on a large 
scale or whether new jobs will be created in other areas—both familiar jobs 
and others no one has yet been able to foresee. In the past, workers have 
adapted to technological revolutions by acquiring new skills. To manage the 
coming transition successfully, an overhaul of the skills of the entire 
population is crucial. The labour market disruption ahead may be greater 
than anything we have seen in the past’. (House of Lords 2015: 21) 
 
Relying on data that ‘makes a judgement’ about the type of digital skills that will be required 
in 361 occupations based on the SOC coding over the next two to three years (UKForCE 
2014), the report claims that digital skills will be required across the workforce, although at 
varying levels. The general position is that there is currently a shortage of medium and high 
level digital skills, that reskilling and upskilling is required across the workforce, and that 
digital skills are urgently required to be integrated across the curriculum at all levels of the 
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education system. The report states that ‘Whole industries are being wiped out due to 
changing technologies, with new ones emerging at the same time’ (House of Lords 2015:50), 
although which industries have been ‘wiped out’ are not identified. Along with digital skills, 
there is some reference to the need for government to invest in lifelong learning to enable 
individuals to continue to access the labour market. 
 
The House of Lord’s report was followed by a very similar enquiry by the House of Commons 
Select Committee on Science and Technology into the ‘digital skills crisis’ (2016a). It also 
refers to the 35 per cent potential jobs losses derived from Frey and Osborne (2013), 
alongside claims that ‘the rise of the Internet of Things, Big Data and robotics means that 
65% of children entering primary school today will be working in roles that do not yet exist’ 
(House of Common Science and Technology Committee 2016a:7), and that ‘90% of new jobs 
require digital skills’ (2016a:13). While Frey and Osborne’s approach may be controversial, 
their data are derived from a clearly specified methodology, as discussed above. However, 
these other figures, which have been widely reported elsewhere, do not appear to be based 
on any research and their origins are untraceable. Nevertheless, on the basis of such 
‘evidence’, the report concludes: ‘the evidence is clear that the UK faces a digital skills crisis’ 
(2016a:3) and that, for businesses, developing the digital skills of their workforce is ‘a 
matter of survival’ (2016a:16). 
 
The Committee, therefore, appears to adopt a negative view of the relationship between 
technology and unemployment, with the world changing dramatically and the potential for 
widespread job losses. At the same time, if government, the education system and 
employers are proactive, including upskilling and reskilling the workforce, great 
opportunities exist as new forms of employment will require higher level skills. While the 
focus is on digital skills, other skills tend to be glossed over: ‘We must equip the next 
generation not just with the skills that we know industry needs today but also with the skills 
they will need for a future not yet imagined.’ (2016a:36). How the education system can 
develop skills for an unimagined future is a point that is not considered. 
 
A further Enquiry was launched by the same Committee in March 2016 into Robotics and 
Artificial Intelligence. A central aim of the Committee was to address the implications for 
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the ‘future UK workforce and job market, and the Government’s preparation for the shift in 
the UK skills base and training that this may require’ (House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee 2016b:7). Some positive views were presented to the Committee, 
suggesting that the overall impact on employment levels was likely to be small, as had 
happened in past technological waves, but that disruption would occur as some sectors 
would grow while others declined (Google DeepMind 2016; Deloitte 2016): ‘it takes time for 
new technologies to actually change employment. Probably, the changes in the very near 
future will be relatively small’ (Farquhar 2016).6 
 
The Committee’s Report also discusses the more pessimistic interpretations of the future of 
work, citing Frey and Osborne’s work (2013) and the Bank of England’s analysis of 15 million 
jobs at risk (Haldane 2015). There is also reference to a McKinsey report that ‘AI was 
contributing to a transformation of society ‘happening ten times faster and at 300 times the 
scale, or roughly 3,000 times the impact’ of the Industrial Revolution’ (Dobbs et al. 2015:2). 
There is some discussion about jobs that are more vulnerable, for example driving a taxi or 
truck, and those that are more difficult to replace, such as creative occupations. Some 
differences emerge as to whether the lowest paid (skilled) jobs are most at risk (Haldane 
2015), or those in middle-income jobs (Deloitte 2016). Osborne (2016:11) is one of the few 
contributors to suggest that new occupations may ‘not be sufficiently well paid to substitute 
for those that are automated away’, thereby suggesting the potential for deskilling, as well 
as reskilling, and for growing levels of inequality.  
 
The Committee’s Report concludes that the extent of future change is unclear: 
 
‘there is no consensus about what this will mean for the UK workforce. Some 
expect rising unemployment as labour is substituted for AI-enabled robots 
and machines. Others foresee a transformation in the type of employment 
available—with the creation of new jobs compensating for those that were 
lost—and the prospect of robotics and AI augmenting existing roles, and 
enabling humans to achieve more than they could on their own.’ (2016b:3) 
 
29 
 
Despite the lack of consensus, the Report claims that ‘a much greater focus is needed on 
adjusting our education and training systems to deliver the skills that will enable people to 
adapt, and thrive, as new technology comes on stream’ (2016b: 3). The position appears to 
be that, although we do not know how extensive changes will be, it is important to be 
prepared and this will involve both reskilling and upskilling. 
 
‘As a nation, we must respond with a readiness to re-skill, and up-skill, on a 
continuing basis. This requires a commitment by the Government to ensure 
that our education and training systems are flexible, so that they can adapt as 
the demands on the workforce change, and are geared up for lifelong 
learning.’ (2016b:16) 
 
The question of what skills will be needed is left unanswered, with the exception of a 
narrow focus on universal digital skills and STEM subjects to aid the growth of robotics and 
AI sectors. ‘Addressing the UK’s digital skills “crisis”… was repeatedly identified in written 
submissions as essential in order to mitigate some of the more potentially negative impacts 
of robotics and AI on employment’ (2016b: 13). Recommendations from the committee 
focus on how to improve the competitive position of the robotics and AI industry, and 
responding to the ‘digital skills crisis’ and digital exclusion. There is no mention of any 
broader employment and skills implications of technological disruption. 
 
The response by Westminster Government to the report focuses on the recommendations 
and does not address issues of employment change. In relation to skills, it claims that the 
Government is ‘working closely with the industry, education and training bodies and charity 
organisations to reduce key skills gaps and address urgent shortages’, and are developing 
digital skills in schools (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2017:3). 
More broadly, issues around the diffusion of new technology have been assigned to the 
productivity agenda, with the establishment of a Productivity Leadership Group, and an 
Industrial Digitalisation Review (2017), composed primarily of business leaders.  
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Policy in the field of robotics and AI has been primarily directed through the former 
Department for Business Innovation and Skills and, from 2016, the Department for Business, 
Energy and Industry Strategy, with some engagement with the Department for Education in 
England, and the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport. In 2012 robotics and 
artificial systems were included as one of the ‘eight great technologies’ that would support 
the Government’s new industrial strategy. Since then, the direction of policy has been 
primarily focused on developing the robotics and AI industry through, for example, 
investment in research and development. There has been rather less discussion about how 
to diffuse technologies across a range of sectors and their implications for work and skills.  
 
The Industrial Strategy (Green Paper 2017; White Paper 2017) and the Digital Strategy 
(2017) are the three most relevant government policy documents. In the Green Paper, it is 
noted that the ‘UK makes less use of robotics and automation than most other countries in 
Western Europe’ (HM Government 2017a:15), and comments on the continued low level of 
investment in research and development. But the document makes little reference to the 
potential disruption to employment. Similarly, the Digital Strategy focuses on access to 
digital infrastructure and digital skills. The Industrial Strategy Green Paper makes one 
substantive reference to employment changes: ‘The world of work is changing too, with one 
study [Frey et al 2014] stating that 35 per cent of existing UK jobs estimated to be at high 
risk of replacement by technology in the next 10 to 20 years, particularly at medium-skill 
levels’’ (2017a: 39). Both the Green Paper and the Digital strategy make reference to the 
unsubstantiated figure identified earlier in the HOC report (HOC 2016b: 7), that 90 percent 
of jobs in the next 20 years will require some digital proficiency. Drawing on an Ipsos Mori 
(2015) survey, both reports note that 23 per cent of adults lack basic digital skills indicating 
a ‘digital skills crisis’.  
 
These strategy papers point to a reluctance to make any direct reference to the impact of 
digital disruption on employment, yet at the same time acknowledging the importance of 
competing within the new environment: 
 
‘As we leave the European Union, it will be even more important to ensure 
that we continue to develop our home-grown talent, up-skill our workforce 
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and develop the specialist digital skills needed to maintain our world leading 
digital sector.’ (DfDCMS 2017, Section 2, parag 4)  
 
‘Innovation can sometimes be disruptive, but ultimately we must embrace 
innovation to keep ahead of the competition, create more good jobs, and 
make sure jobs in the UK are secure.’ (HM Government 2017a: 25) 
 
There is also a long-established emphasis on the importance of skills for competitiveness, 
productivity and individual wages. The Green Paper, for example, points to the usual 
concerns around a lack of basic skills, intermediate technical skills and STEM subjects at all 
levels. These skills are seen as desirable for a modern economy but references are also 
made to technological change, although with a narrow focus on the robotics and AI sector 
as opposed to the broader prospects for employment. There is some recognition of the 
requirement for retraining over the life course: 
 
 ‘Faster changes in technology mean we need to help more people retrain in 
new skills, so we will embed the concept of lifelong learning. To renew 
communities affected by economic changes and support people in industries 
at risk of decline, we will explore new approaches including more effective 
outreach directly into workplaces to promote retraining.’ (2017a: 16)  
 
The White Paper Industrial Strategy makes even less reference to employment disruption, 
and instead notes on a number of occasions that employment has been growing over recent 
years: ‘At the moment, our problem is not unemployment caused by technology, it is low 
earning power caused by, among other reasons, a failure to use technology’ (HM 
Government 2017b: 98). An optimistic future is presented in terms of a growing demand for 
high skilled workers, and the requirement for upskilling and reskilling of the existing 
workforce:  
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‘Research predicts around 1.8 million new jobs will be created between 2014 
and 2024, and 70 per cent of them will be in the occupations most likely to 
employ graduates.’ (2017b:100) 
 
‘We will ensure that everyone can improve their skills throughout their lives, 
increasing their earning power and opportunities for better jobs. We will 
equip citizens for jobs shaped by next generation technology. As the 
economy adapts, we want everyone to access and enjoy good work.’ (2017b: 
94) 
 
The White Paper points to the importance of improving technical education, digital skills 
and STEM subjects, and much of the policy measures relate to changes in initial education, 
apprenticeships and additional funding for robotic and AI related research degrees. While 
current skills shortages are frequently cited as the problem, improving STEM and digital 
skills are also linked more directly to future changes in technology. To respond to concerns 
around the necessity for lifelong learning, enhanced access to basic digital skills and a 
national retraining scheme are proposed in the Industry Strategy: ‘We will also promote a 
new adult digital skills entitlement to support basic training and our new National Retraining 
Scheme will help people re-skill and up-skill as the economy changes, including as a result of 
automation’ (HM Government 2017b: 39).  
 
Legislation has been introduced to give adults without basic digital skills the right to access 
free training in England (The Digital Economy Bill 2017). This builds on existing rights to free 
basic literacy and numeracy courses that were seen as a key part of the solution to the 
‘basic skills crisis’. An advisory group to the Retraining Scheme has also been established 
with representatives from the CBI and the TUC, and an initial focus on digital skills and the 
construction industry.  
 
While initially suggesting the potential for dramatic changes in employment, policy 
initiatives are then presented within an optimistic view of the future. There is, however, 
little reflection on any evidence about the scale and nature of any change and a lack of 
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detailed analysis of the implications for skills. A more active role for government in 
industrial policy is accepted, but the underlying assumption is that with the right skills and 
investment in infrastructure and R&D, jobs will be available for individuals to fill at a higher 
or equivalent skill levels. In other words, the policy response remains wedded to the labour 
scarcity approach outlined above.  
4.2 Influencing policy 
 
In the UK, a variety of interest groups have attempted to influence the UK Government’s 
approach to robotics and AI. Scientific and technical experts have focused primarily on R&D, 
while the peak representatives of employers (the CBI) and trade unions (TUC) have called 
for a broad enquiry into the impact on future employment. 
 
In 2013, the Technology Strategy Board, a BIS (Department for Business Innovation and 
Skills) funded body, established the Robotics and Autonomous Systems Special Interest 
Group which brought together ‘researchers, industrialists and civil servants to produce a 
national strategy’ on robotics and autonomous systems (RAS-SIG 2014).7 Their strategy 
report focused primarily on how to enhance the capacity of the sector, although it also 
included the aim of establishing the UK as a leader ‘in the implementation of RAS 
technology’ (2014:4, emphasis added). In relation to the impact on jobs and skills, the tone 
is largely positive; references are made to the potential for automation to re-shore 
production in manufacturing, thereby creating jobs. It also suggests that technology in the 
care sector could provide ‘lifting capability, automatic cleaning’ so that workers’ jobs could 
be redesigned to concentrate on caring activities. Although there is no general analysis of 
how skill demands are likely to change, the main skills-related policy proposals refer to 
extending higher-level engineering and science skills within the sector.  
 
More recently, the university-based UK-RAS Network (funded by the EPSRC8) has produced 
a number of papers that include broad policy recommendations, alongside proposals 
related to specific industries and sectors, such as social care and the extreme environment. 
These explore the issues from an industry or technical viewpoint with an ongoing theme 
about the need to develop specialist skills for the industry. Overall, the view of most of 
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these reports is relatively optimistic about the changing job structure – with robots seen as 
replacing routine tasks and with the potential for a growth in higher skilled jobs (eg. UK-RAS 
Network 2016, 2017a). However, a more cautious tone is adopted in an overview paper (UK-
RAS Network 2017b: 39) which warns that both manual jobs and office work at intermediate 
level are likely to be lost and that government needs to intervene to ensure that the 
benefits of automation are ‘distributed equally’. These reports are generally dismissive of 
the pessimistic approach to employment decline, identified in the earlier part of this paper, 
although there is a more mixed account of how changes in employment will affect skill 
demands.  
The recent government-commissioned Taylor report into modern work practices makes 
little reference to the impact of RAI, apart from its role in providing the platforms for the 
‘gig economy’. There is a short commentary on the potential changes in job structure 
drawing on Frey and Osborne (2013), Haldane (2015) and DeLoitte (2015). The report, 
however, confidently asserts that skills are the answer: ‘ensuring the labour force is 
equipped with the necessary skills for a modern labour market will be important and will 
mitigate uneven redistribution of wealth caused by any possible ‘hollowing out’ effect’ 
(Taylor 2017:30). It is an area of ‘a watching brief’ rather than immediate intervention 
(2017:31). 
 
A number of these developments cut across the nations of the UK in relation to industrial 
policy, although skills are a devolved issue. In Scotland, the main focus has been on digital 
infrastructure and the provision of digital skills and encouraging more young people into 
STEM (DfDCMS 2017:15). However, it has established a new Strategic Labour Market Group 
comprised of government, academics, business and trade unions which will include issues 
related to ‘how automation and digitisation will impact on the future of work’. The recent 
Scottish TUC and Scottish Government joint report on technological change and the Scottish 
labour market provides a more nuanced, reflective piece than has been seen from 
Westminster (Scottish Government 2018). Innovation Wales strategy was produced in 2014 
and highlights the employment opportunities of developing high technology sectors rather 
than issues of jobs losses. It has recently commissioned an Independent Review on digital 
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innovation to investigate the challenges and opportunities it presents for skills, jobs and the 
labour market in Wales.9 
 
The House of Lords and House of Commons select committees’ reports emphasise that 
government should be doing more to explore the potential impact of digital disruption on 
employment. This view is echoed by both the CBI and TUC: 
 
‘Government should set up a joint Commission in 2018 involving business, 
academics, employee representatives and a minister to examine the impact 
of AI on people and jobs, with recommendations for action and policy.’ (CBI 
2017:11) 
 
‘The first step for Government in this area could therefore be to… convene a 
year-long inquiry on the future of work, with representation from unions, 
business organisations, and experts in the field. The inquiry could investigate 
how to ensure that technology can help meet the aims of the government’s 
industrial strategy, including raising productivity, addressing regional 
inequalities, and most importantly improving the quality of and reward for 
work’. (TUC 2017:44)  
 
The CBI presents a more optimistic picture of the impact of technology than the TUC, 
although with the caveat that government must take action to ensure that businesses are 
successful in the new environment:  
 
‘With leading entrepreneurial talent, a competitive financial ecosystem and 
world-class research and development the UK has a golden opportunity to 
lead the way in unlocking the potential of new technologies and build upon 
its reputation as a renowned hub for disruptive innovation.’ (CBI 2017:3) 
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While there is little reference to potential employment effects in their most recent report, 
skills are identified as one of the barriers. In an earlier report (CBI 2017:2), there is a 
reference to the McKinsey claim that AI will have 3000 times the impact of the industrial 
revolution (Dobbs et al 2016:2). There is no mention of this type of figure in the latest 
paper, but instead there is a call for more AI specialist skills, and the need for an 
‘increasingly data literate workforce’ (CBI, 2017:11). 
 
The TUC has produced a discussion paper specifically focusing on the issues of employment. 
As with the CBI, they stress the importance of investing in these technologies but they are 
primarily concerned with the distribution of the benefits. Drawing on Frey and Osborne 
(2013), Arntz et al (2016), Haldane (2015) and PWC (2017), the report concludes:  
 
‘Perhaps the main conclusion to be drawn from this is that the impact of 
automation on jobs is uncertain – with estimates ranging from 10 per cent to 
30 per cent of jobs in the UK being at risk. It is important to note that these 
do not mean that the total number of jobs will decrease by 10-30 per cent; if 
the past is a guide to the future, then the likelihood is that these jobs could 
be replaced by new occupations and professions. What we do know is that a 
significant number of current jobs are liable to be lost to digitalisation and 
that policy makers must plan to mitigate that outcome’. (TUC 2017:26)  
 
The TUC report also presents a more pessimistic scenario of job losses, focusing on the 
digital divide and those ‘left behind’, given that new jobs are assumed to require ‘reskilling’. 
The expectation is that those with lower level skills and lower wages will be more at risk and 
that ‘a skilled and diverse workforce’ (2017:45) is required to enable the UK to reap the 
benefits of technology. The report recommends a focus on those already in the workplace; 
‘mid-career workers’ who are most likely to be ‘left behind’. This would require increased 
investment in adult education and lifelong learning and retraining focused on those facing 
redundancy (2017: 46).  
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The review of policy indicates a lack of any systematic analysis of the evidence base for 
future employment changes. As outlined in earlier Sections, there is a lack of consensus 
about the extent of change, with much of the research driven by consultancy and high tech 
companies, rather than by academic researchers. Although there is an ongoing assumption 
that disruption to employment is inevitable, the policy response is predominantly focused 
on the supply side, in particular the digital skills crisis and the shortage of high level 
technical skills. The approach is consistent with a labour scarcity approach closely associated 
with orthodox human capital theory. Here the major challenge is one of reskilling or 
upskilling the workforce, rather than any concern that mid and higher-level jobs may be 
subject to digitalisation and, therefore, deskilling. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The reviewed literature has given rise to a stimulating and certainly relevant debate given 
that it addresses pressing social issues that are central to the future of economic 
development, income distribution, and individual wellbeing, across the globe. Some main 
points can be extracted from this review.  
 
First, there are major limitations to the existing research on digital technologies and their 
implications for skills and the future of work. As outlined in section 2, there are major 
methodological differences in studies that attempt to predict the extent of automation, and 
the time scales for change are often vague or unspecified. It is generally conceded that it is 
even more difficult to identify the jobs that will be created over the next 30 years. An 
element of caution is, therefore, required when developing policy in the context of 
‘evidence’ that is highly contested.   
 
Second, we have identified three main approaches to the likely impact on skills, but it is the 
labour scarcity view which continuity to dominate policy discussions. It maintains that the 
economy will continue to create new employment opportunities as it has done in previous 
periods of economic upheaval. It also maintains a human capital approach to government 
policy with a focus on supply-side solutions. The job scarcity view has received far less 
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attention because it points to a splintering or segmentation of established forms of 
graduate or professional work, which presents a direct challenge to the core assumptions 
informing much of the existing policy literature. The end of work scenario is even more 
problematic from a policy perspective and is yet to receive serious policy consideration.  
  
Third, government policy is focused on developing robotics and AI as a key industrial sector 
and employment/skills issues are defined predominantly in relation to lack of scientific, 
computing and engineering skills. The underlying assumption is that there is a shortage of 
workers in these areas and a shortage of skills across other sectors. The emphasis on basic 
digital skills for ‘everyone’ is justified in terms of inclusion (e.g. access to markets and to 
public services), and employment, where digital proficiency is seen in the same light as basic 
numeracy and literacy. There is an assumption that these technologies will diffuse across all 
sectors, requiring generalised ‘reskilling’ or ‘upskilling’. It is important to question this 
technological determinist view of both the use and diffusion of technology and the 
consequences for skills. To date, there has been very little research examining the realities 
of how robotics and AI are reshaping occupations within the workplace.  
 
Fourth, given the above, the policy focus in the UK is centred on the ‘digital skills crisis’, 
pointing to continuity rather than change in policy narrative. The supply side focus remains 
key in policy accounts as education and skills are seen as essential factors in enabling young 
people and those already in work to navigate the future successfully. Nevertheless, there is 
a lack of detailed discussion of what kinds of technical skills are required beyond broad 
STEM qualifications. While the ‘digital skills crisis’ is frequently referenced, there is a lack of 
specifics about what precise skills are being demanded by employers (and are currently 
lacking) that apply broadly to young people and those already employed. However, there is 
some recognition from the various non-governmental reports that it might be useful to 
focus on developing alternative skills that are not easily automated, such as those with 
strong components of creativity, interpersonal and social skills. In some ways, this reflects 
earlier debates about the type of education required to support workers in periods of rapid 
technological innovation. There are also many calls for education to develop the skills of the 
future or to ‘future proof’ young people by introducing an alternative curriculum. However, 
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government policy tends to emphasise ad hoc answers, such as to introduce coding in the IT 
curriculum for every pupil.  
 
Fifth, there is little evidence that research on AI and automation, such as claims of large 
numbers of jobs at risk, is being used to ignite a wider agenda about the human capital 
bargain based on ‘learning equals earning’. The job scarcity and end of work approaches 
both view a significant mismatch due to inadequate demand for skilled labour. They also 
point to the limits of the labour market to resolve distributional issues concerning who does 
what and gets what. Therefore, issues of (re)distribution are conspicuous in their absence, 
given growing interest in basic income initiatives in recognition that the future of work will 
not result in a shared prosperity, but depends on significant institutional reform beyond 
education and training systems (Haldane, 2018 Brown, et al. forthcoming).  
 
Sixth, the process of developing policy in this area is largely seen as an issue for employers 
and government, as they respond to the forces of technological change. However, the 
introduction of technology is a social and economic process with actors playing an 
important role in shaping whether and how technological change takes place and with what 
consequences. Recent initiatives to develop policy around the digital economy in Germany 
and Norway include representatives from employer associations, trade unions and civil 
society, with a focus on consultation and engagement with society more broadly about a 
vision for the future workplace and how to shape it through technology (FMLSA 2017:216).  
There are some moves to a more social partnership model in Scotland and Wales in relation 
to policy in this area, but in England, the approach is largely one that emphasises 
competitiveness and productivity as a route to delivering a shared prosperity. 
 
We have identified major difficulties in establishing the likely implications of robotics and 
digital technologies on employment and skill demand. Where might future research best be 
deployed? While there is always a place for predictions about future scenarios, their use is 
limited given the complex relationship between technology, employment and skills. The 
pace and shape of technological change is subject to a whole variety of factors from 
economic incentives to the social, ethical and regulatory aspects, as well as the different 
power relations within organisations among different groups (professionals, trade unions, 
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managers), and broader societal relationships. In the post WWII era, there were many in-
depth studies of new technologies, but these are largely lacking today. International 
comparative research would also be helpful in exploring how national institutional contexts 
may help to shape different outcomes. Furthermore, the very notion of ‘digital skills’ 
requires unpacking in terms of the specific demands from employers, different 
requirements for specific occupational groups, and those needed for broader societal 
engagement.  
 
In terms of moving forward on policy in the UK, engaging a broader range of stakeholders 
would enable the government to adopt a more pro-active approach to technologies that 
seeks to ask broader social and ethical issues about where automation can improve the 
quality of life and where it may be detrimental. It also requires an interdisciplinary approach 
to address its potential impact on all aspects of economy and society. In Clark Kerr and 
colleagues (1960:9) classic study of Industrialism and Industrial Man they observe that ‘an 
age of change is an age of speculations and of decisions’, and these decisions will reflect 
how we understand what is disruptive about disruptive technologies, along with its 
potential to shape technologies for the benefit of all rather than the few.  
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